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For most of the last decade, water policy in Australia has been dominated by 
emergency responses to what was, on most measures, the worst drought in 
our  history.  Irrigators  have  received  only  small  fractions  of  their  normal 
allocations  of  water,  while  urban  water  users  have  been  subject  to 
restrictions of a stringency unparalleled in our recent experience.  
Debate continues on the extent to which the recent drought was the result of 
(natural or anthropogenic) climate change, and therefore on whether it can be 
seen as an exceptional shock or as a foretaste of a hotter and drier climate. At 
a minimum, it seems clear that the relatively wet conditions of the second 
half of the 20th century, which formed the basis of most water planning, are 
unlikely to recur. 
Despite the breaking of the drought in most regions, therefore, Australian 
water policy must deal with a fundamentally new environment. The era of 
abundant water availability, already reaching its limits in the 1980s, is now 
clearly behind us. 
When resources are scarce, the price mechanism invariably comes into play, 
either openly or through various forms of quasi-markets. The central theme 
of water policy pronouncements over the past two decades has been the need 
to  make  water  prices  and  water  markets  more  transparent  and  efficient. 
Policy practice, however, has been far less consistent. 
This  paper  presents  a  summary  of  the  development  of  water  policy  in 
Australia,  and  an  assessment  of  the  current  state  of  play.  The  analyses 
focuses  on  the  contrast  between  the  policies  of  the  Victorian  government, 
which seek to maintain rationing in various forms, and those embodied in the 
Commonwealth government’s Water for the Future Plan, which has shown at least some willingness to use prices and market-based policy instruments to 
achieve a more sustainable and efficient allocation of water resources. 
1. History 
The history of irrigated agriculture in the Murray–Darling Basin has been 
dominated by government or government-sponsored development initiatives. 
Until  the  1980s,  Australian  irrigation  policy  was  in  the  expansion  phase 
characteristic  of  water  systems  where  resource  constraints  are  not 
immediately binding1. By the late 1980s, however, the capacity of the Basin 
to  support  additional  diversions  was  close  to  exhaustion.  The  response, 
adopted in the early 1990s, was twofold. 
First,  the  Murray-Darling  Basin  Commission  implemented  a  Salinity  and 
Drainage Strategy to improve water quality in the River Murray to control 
land  degradation  and,  where  possible,  to  rehabilitate  land  resources.  The 
strategy is estimated to have reduced salinity levels at Morgan (the offtake 
for  water  to  Adelaide)  by  around  100  EC  units  (about  20  per  cent) 
(Department of Water, Land and Biodiversity Conservation, South Australia 
2006). 
Second,    a  series  of  initiatives  were  introduced  to  to  replace  bureaucratic 
systems of water allocation based on licenses with a unified market system 
based tradeable water rights. It was hoped that markets would ensure that 
water  was  allocated  to  its  most  socially  valuable  use.  The  market-based 
approach  was  first  set  out  in  the  communique  of  the  1994  Council  of 
Australian Governments meeting, which set out an agenda for water reform 
                                                 
1 Alan  Randall    (1981),  ‘Property  entitlements  and  pricing  policies  for  a  maturing  water 
economy’,  Australian  Journal  of  Agricultural  Economics,  25(3),  195–220  provides  an 
excellent discussion. 
  In 1995, a Cap was imposed on extractions of water from the system. Under 
the Cap extractions were limited to the volume of water that would have been 
diverted under the levels of development prevailing in 1993-94. The Cap was 
initially an interim measure, designed to prevent unsustainable growth in 
water use while a more market oriented approach was developed. 
By  the  early  2000s,  it  was  apparent  that  policy  had  failed  to  generate 
sustainable allocations of water. These problems were exacerbated by years 
of severe drought. The  crisis produced a series of responses, each reflecting 
the  actual  or  perceived  failure  of  its  predecessors  :  the  Living  Murray 
Program (2002), the National Water Initiative (2004), the National Plan for 
Water Security (2007). There were also initiatives at the state level, largely 
devoted to improving the efficiency of irrigation systems. Despite substantial 
public expenditure, these measures achieved little or nothing.  
Advocates of centralised control over water supplies have frequently blamed 
state government obstruction for the failure of water reform. In reality the 
picture  is  far  more  complicated.  Different  states  have  taken  different 
positions.    Among  the  states,  South  Australia,  the  biggest  loser  from  the 
current system has been an active proponent of reform, while other states 
have sought to preserve an unsustainable status quo. 
Conversely,  particularly  under  the  Howard  government,  these    differences 
were  reflected  in  divisions  within  the  Commonwealth  government,  with 
some,  such  as  Malcolm  Turnbull  promoting  reform  and  others,  including 
Howard himself, actively obstructing it. 
2. Victoria 
The policies adopted the Commonwealth government have been confused and 
contradictory,  but  have  involved  a  gradual  movement  towards  prices  that 
reflect the social cost of water, and towards the use of market mechanisms to 
improve the allocation of water. Those of the Victorian government have been more  consistent.  Unfortunately,  however,  they  have  been  consistently 
misguided. 
 Among a series of policy failures, three examples stand out: restrictions on 
irrigation  trade,  permanent  restrictions  on  urban  water  use  and  the  Food 
Bowl Modernisation Project. In all these cases, the Victorian government has 
intervened to dictate patterns of water use that reflect neither the economic 
value of water nor the benefits of allowing rural and urban water users to 
make their own choices regarding how much water to use and how to use it. 
Limits on Water Trading 
A central theme of the National Water Initiative was the need to allow trade 
in  water  entitlements,  along  with  temporary  trade  in  annual  water 
allocations. The idea was to allow water to be allocated to its most valuable 
use,  and  to  allow  holders  of  water  rights  to  maximize  the  value  of  their 
assets. 
Progress towards this goal proved frustratingly slow. In large measure this 
was  because  of  restrictions  imposed  at  the  behest  of  the  Victorian 
government 
Victoria applied the 4 per cent annual limit rigorously with the explicit aim of 
restricting trade. The 4 per cent annual limit was applied separately to each 
of  the  10  irrigation  districts  in  the  state,  and  separately  to  different 
reliability classes of water access entitlements (high and low reliability water 
shares). In addition, a 10 per cent limit was applied to total transfers of water 
entitlements out of any jurisdiction. 
Because of the limits imposed in the agreement, and continued resistance to 
the use of market mechanisms, the NWI yielded minimal progress in its first 
three years of operation. The combination of continuing drought conditions, 
the  maturing  of  markets  for  temporary  and  permanent  irrigation entitlements  and  the  entry  of  the  Commonwealth  as  a  buyer  brought  the 
contradictions inherent in the NWI into sharp relief. 
 As demand and prices increased, so did the number of holders of water rights 
willing  to  meet  that  demand  by  selling  their  entitlements.  The  Victorian 
limits became an effective restriction on trade, to the extent that applications 
to sell permanent entitlements reached the limit in the first few days of the 
irrigation season. 
Commenting  on  the  Victorian  policy,  the  National  Water  Commission 
observed2 
The annual 4% limit on water entitlement trading out 
of  an  irrigation  area  is  being  reached  in  regions  in 
several basin states, with a wide range of undesirable 
consequences. The Commission considers that the 4% 
limit  has  impeded  the  use  of  buyback  programs  to 
assist  in  returning  overallocated  water  systems  to 
sustainable  levels  of  extraction;  unfairly  and 
arbitrarily  penalised  willing  sellers  of  irrigation 
entitlements; distorted patterns of water trade out of 
irrigation areas (including interstate trade); inhibited 
desirable  and  necessary  structural  change;  and 
complicated interstate collaboration in other areas of 
water reform. 
Policies  aimed  at  preventing  irrigators  from  selling  their  entitlements  are 
collapsing  under  the  weight  of  their  own  contradictions.  Faced  with  the 
prospect of paying higher costs for increasingly unreliable water allocations, 
irrigators in a number of districts have voted to sell their entitlements en 
masse. Some are retiring, and others moving to districts where irrigation is 
more cost-effective. 
                                                 
2 National Water Commission (2009), ‘Australian water reform 2009: Second biennial assessment of 
progress in implementation of the National Water Initiative’, http://www.nwc.gov.au/www/html/147-
introduction---2009-biennial-assessments.asp Permanent water restrictions for urban users 
As  in  most  Australian  cities,  households  in  Melbourne  were  subject  to 
stringent water restrictions during the long drought of the first decade of the 
21st century, which threatened to exhaust water supplies. And, as in most 
Australian cities, the restrictions were relaxed, but not removed when rain 
broke the drought and refilled the dams. The current policy of the Victorian 
government is that restrictions on the use of water are to remain in place 
indefinitely. 
It  is  worth  reflecting  on  how  extraordinary  a  policy  this  is.  Except  in 
emergency conditions such as wartime or temporary interruptions of supply, 
rationing of consumption of goods and services has been virtually unknown in 
Australia.  In  the  case  of  water,  supply  restrictions  have  been  inposed  in 
drought. In the emergency context of a drought, people are generally happy to 
comply  with  restrictions,  and  substantial  reductions  in  usage  can  be 
achieved. But the longer restrictions are maintained, the less effective they 
are likely to be. Voluntary compliance tends to decline as emergency fades 
into  normality,  and  people  find  new  ways  to  use  water  which  satisfy  the 
letter, if not the spirit, of restrictions. 
Despite  the  somewhat  puritanical  appeal  of  ‘saving  water’,  the  idea  that 
urban dwellers should be forced to restrict their water use to leave more for 
agriculture lacks any coherent ethical basis. One particularly misleading idea 
is that water used in urban areas comes at the expense of food production 
and is therefore morally undesirable. Within agriculture (and subject to some 
of the restrictions mentioned already) water flows to the use where it has the 
highest value. In general, the result has been that the allocation of water to 
non-food  crops,  such  as  cotton  and  wine  grapes  have  expanded,  at  the 
expense of food crops including rice and fruit.  
In a market system, such outcomes are the inevitable result of the workings 
of the price mechanism. It may be reasonable to contemplate alternatives to the market system that might do a better job in feeding the world as a whole. 
But  arbitrary  interventions  that  sacrifice  suburban  vegetable  gardens  in 
order to provide more water for commercial crops make neither ethical nor 
economic sense. 
Finally, and perhaps most importantly, permanent restrictions on water use 
are counterproductive with respect to the security of essential supplies. Until 
the last decade, urban water systems were managed on the basis that, under 
normal  conditions,  supply  would  be  sufficient  to  meet  all  demands  at  the 
prevailing (low) prices. Under drought conditions, restrictions could then be 
imposed to reduce consumption, beginning with relatively modest restrictions 
and proceeding gradually to more stringent measures. 
In  the  presence  of  growing  demand,  and  with  the  exhaustion  of  low  cost 
supplies of water derived from rainfall in catchment areas in or near urban 
centres, the usual outcome would be an increase in prices. Such an increase 
would finance the addition of new sources of supply such as desalination and 
recycling plants. Less obviously, but equally importantly, higher prices would 
provide  households  with  incentives  to  invest  in  water-saving  appliances, 
efficient irrigation systems and so on. If prices are allowed to do the job of 
matching long-run supply and demand, restrictions are still available as an 
option to manage short-run shocks, such as droughts. 
 By contrast, under current policy, the capacity of moderate restrictions to 
constrain consumption is used to avoid matching supply and demand under 
normal conditions. So, in the event of an unexpected shortfall in supply, the 
only  policy  instruments  remaining    are  large  price  increases  or  draconian 
restrictions on water use, neither of which are likely to be very cost-effective. 
Restrictions on water use are, in the end, an abridgement of freedom that can 
only be justified by emergency conditions, such as a drought of unforeseen 
severity. Permanent restrictions on water use have no place in Australian 
society. The ‘Food Bowl Modernisation Project’ 
The ‘Food Bowl Modernisation Project’ sounds hard to disagree with, which 
may  be  an  indication  that  it  should  be  viewed  with  more  than  usual 
scepticism. The first stage involved spending more than $1 billion to upgrade 
irrigation facilities in the hope of reducing ‘losses’ of water through leakage, 
seepage  and  evaporation  (leakage  refers  to  water  that  flows  through  the 
walls, and seepage to the absorption of water into the soil from the bottom of 
channels). The water saved as a result, estimated at 225 gigalitres, is to be 
divided  equally  between  agriculture,  the  environment  and  urban  use  in 
Melbourne.  
The  Food  Bowl  project  sounds  like  a  win  all  round,  and  has  attracted 
considerable  support.  The  main  criticism  has  come  from  irrigators  and 
support groups such as ‘Plug the Pipe’, who object to Melbourne receiving any 
additional water. 
The estimated water savings have been sharply criticised, most recently by 
Victoria’s Auditor-General. In a recent report, the AG concluded that ‘Cost-
benefit analyses were superficial and there was no information to support the 
basis for water savings assumptions (p 15) and that  ‘There was no evidence 
that any ofthe projects had undergone a robust assessment of the need to 
invest in asset solutions, rather than non-asset solutions, as the main way to 
increase irrigation efficiency or to secure Victoria’s water supplies.’ (P viii) 
Claimed  environmental  savings  are  particularly  dubious.  From  the 
historically  dominant  viewpoint  of  irrigators,  ‘leakage’  and  ‘seepage’ 
represents a loss of water that could otherwise be put to use. But this water 
is not necessarily lost to the environment. Strictly speaking, and with the 
exception  of  evaporation,  all  water  lost  in  irrigation  returns  to  the 
environment in one form or another. Because groundwater and streamflows 
are closely linked, a substantial proportion of the water that leaks or seeps from irrigation channels eventually returns to the river system from which it 
was taken. 
Even accepting the government’s estimates, the cost of water saved through 
the  scheme  is  around  $4000/ML,  compared  to  a  market  price  for  high 
reliability  water  entitlements  of  between  $1000/ML  and  $2000/ML.  Since 
irrigators  are  already  able  to  trade  in  this  market,  the  water  provided  to 
them must be evaluated at this price, yielding a benefit of a little over $100 
million  (75 GL at $1500/GL = $110  million).  The  remaining water  for  the 
environment  and  urban  use  amounts  to  150Gl  at  a  cost  of  around  $900 
million or $6000/ML. If the double-counted return of leakage and seeage is 
disregarded, the cost of water for Melbourne reaches $10 000/ML, as much as 
ten  times  the  price  for  which  the  water  could  be  bought  from  irrigators 
willing to sell it. 
Water for the Future 
The  election  of  the  Rudd  government  produced  yet  another  initiative:  the 
Water for the Future plan (2008).  Ambiguous both in concept and execution, 
this plan nonetheless offers some hope that Australia may finally have got 
water policy right. In particular, and for the first time, the government has 
been  willing  to  tackle  the  over-allocation  problem  through  large  scale 
repurchase of water entitlements.  
The focus on repurchase represents a reversal of the priorities presented in 
the  Howard  government’s  National  Plan  for  Water  Security,  a  poll-driven 
exercise produced largely by Howard himself. Despite promising expenditure 
of more than $10 billion, Howard sought no advice Treasury, eliciting a rare 
protest from Treasury Secretary Ken Henry. 
It is easy to see why Treasury was bypassed. The policy thinking that went 
into the plan was very similar to that of the Victorian government. Markets 
and prices, supposedly central to the National Water Initiative, were barely mentioned.  Instead,  the  main  plan  was  to  spend  $6  billion  on  upgrading 
irrigation systems. As Treasury would certainly have pointed out, such a plan 
makes no sense if the cost of the water ‘saved’ in this way exceeds the price at 
which irrigators are willing to sell their entitlements.  
Howard’s  plan  did  include  $3  billion  allocated  to  the  purchase  of  water 
entitlements, but this was presented as a last resort, to be considered only 
after  the  budget  for  engineering  works  had  been  exhausted.  The  only 
redeeming feature of the Howard plan was that, having been prepared with 
an eye to election-year cosmetics, it was substantially ‘back-loaded’. That is, 
very little money was budgeted for the first two years, and so very little had 
been spent or committed by the time the government lost office. 
The Rudd government has reversed the priorities of the Howard plan, and 
has  focused  attention  on  the  purchase  of  water  entitlements  from  willing 
sellers.  As at 31 December 2009 the Restoring the Balance in the Murray-
Darling Basin program had secured the purchase of 766 gigalitres of water 
entitlements worth over $1.2 billion.3 That is about three times the amount 
claimed for the Food Bowl Modernisation project, at about the same cost. 
Unfortunately, the Rudd government has maintained Howard’s commitment 
to spend $6 billion on engineering works. It seems unlikely that many such 
projects will be cost effective, so much of this money is likely to be wasted. 
There  are  many  more  worthwhile  opportunities  for  large-scale  capital 
expenditure in improving Australia’s river systems.  
For example, increased flows of sediment and nutrients from river systems, 
the  result  of  urban  settlement  and  agricultural  land  use,  are  a  major 
contributor to the decline of inshore reef systems in the Great Barrier Reef. 
Projects that aimed to restore water quality and assist in more sustainable 
                                                 
3 http://www.environment.gov.au/water/publications/mdb/restoring-balance.html land use could help to enhance the resilience of the Great Barrier Reef to 
threats such as climate change. 
The Way Forward 
In some respects, the outlook for water policy in Australia is more hopeful 
than it has been for some time. The breaking of the drought has staved off 
the  prospect  of  a  catastrophic  failure  of  agricultural  and  ecosystems.  The 
Commonwealth  government  has  finally  broken  the  taboo  against  market 
purchases  of  water  entitlements,  improving  the  chances  of  a  return  to 
sustainable allocations. 
On the other hand, there is a substantial risk that further billions will be 
wasted on engineering schemes with overstated ‘savings’ of water achieved at 
massive  cost.  There  are  plenty  of  genuine  problems  in  Australia’s  river 
systems that could be addressed with this money. 
And, looming above all is the prospect of climate change. In the absence of 
global action to mitigate climate change, a combination of reduced rainfall 
and higher evaporation could reduce inflows to the Murray-Darling Basin by 
50  per  cent  or  more  over  coming  decades.  Droughts  like  that  of  the  last 
decade  would  become  normal  rather  than  exceptional  events.  The  result 
would  be  to  render  most  forms  of  irrigated  agriculture  unviable.  Severe 
damage to natural ecosystems would be inevitable. 
We can, perhaps, remedy the mistakes of the past in relation to water policy. 
But such efforts will be in vain unless the world as a whole can avoid similar 
mistakes in relation to the global climate. 
 